Showing posts with label Proper basicality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Proper basicality. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

A Return to Proper basicality and Sola Scriptura

This post is a continuation of my first post on this blog, which can be found here.

Perry Robinson has attacked my use of Alvin Plantinga's epistemology to warrant the Biblical canon as properly basic.

Perry Writes:

"As an aside, the appeal to proper basicality isn’t going to help you. First, why can’t someone just as easily hold that the Great Pumpkin is properly basic? Why can’t David simply retort that his Catholicism is properly basic? How does a belief being properly basic imply that it is true or amount to a reason for thinking that it is? And can one take a belief to be properly basic and it turn out that it is not in fact so for them? If so, what work concerning warrant has proper basicality done for us? None."


The purpose of this post is to respond to all of these objections and to defend my previous post that Protestantism is more rational than Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy.

Response to Objection 1:First, why can’t someone just as easily hold that the Great Pumpkin is properly basic?

If the great pumpkin was similar to the story of Santa or the tooth fairy then certainly young children who believed their parents and were functioning properly (and fulfilled the other necessary conditions I laid out) would be warranted. But of course as they aged they would see with obvious defeaters that such a belief is entirely unwarranted. Most people in our culture find out that Santa doesn't actually exists because they have no reason to believe it and they have a massive defeater, namely, that it is tradition in our culture to pretend with our children that a overweight man gives us Christmas present if we are good. Once the adult who is functioning properly realizes this to be the case they will of course give up their belief in Santa. The problem is I don't see how the great pumpkin or Santa objection is a threat to proper functionalism. After all properly basic beliefs can be extremely fallible and subject to revision. So no problem here!

Response to Objection 2:Why can’t David simply retort that his Catholicism is properly basic?

He could say this. I have never said that he couldn't say that the church authority is properly basic. The problem is this: Why do you need the church if the scripture is already God's words and that are self-attesting by the Holy Spirit (which forms in us beliefs that fulfill all the necessary conditions that I have given in my previous post). This falls into my ockham's razor argument on a previous post I have made.

Response to Objection 3: How does a belief being properly basic imply that it is true or amount to a reason for thinking that it is?

This third objection is actually two objections. A belief being properly basic implies that it is true because we have a properly basic belief that our faculties are functioning properly to produce mostly true beliefs rather than false ones. The second objection on this part assumes that we need a reason for basic beliefs and thus assumes some form of internalism. Since this theory of knowledge that Reformed epistemologists hold to is externalistic then to assume internalistic view of warrant is to just beg the very question at hand.

Response to Objection 4: And can one take a belief to be properly basic and it turn out that it is not in fact so for them?

I don't even know if this is an objection. This is just asking the question: that can properly basic beliefs be fallible? But of course Plantinga and other Reformed epsiteemologists think so. I happen to think so as well. But it's hard to see how one being possibly mistaken about a properly basic belief could constitute a defeater for things that we know fallibly in properly basic way.

Response to Objection 5: If so, what work concerning warrant has proper basicality done for us? None.

This argument assumes that in order for beliefs to be basic we ought to have infallible justification for them. So in other words Perry is arguing that basic beliefs are worthless if we do not know them infallibly. But my question is this: Why think that warrant and knowledge of properly basic beliefs requires infallible justification? I can see no reason. It seems to me that the statement that properly basic beliefs ought to be infallible in order for us to have knowledge or to be useful is neither infallibly properly basic or something that can be inferred by these infallible basic beliefs. So it seems to me that this requirement is self-referentially incoherent. The question that I think Perry or any internalistic epistemologist cannot answer is this: How do we know about the existence of other minds? What about the existence of the external world? Or that our memory is reliable? Or that our sense perception is reliable? Or that we have existed longer than 5 minutes? What about the problem of induction? These answers internalistic (and especially infalliblist on justification) cannot answer. Thus, this sadly and ultimately leads to some form of skepticism.

In Conclusion:

Perry's questions of doubt about Reformed epistemology seem to be wanting at best. Thus, the Protestant can hold up the Bible and say that he is warranted in thinking that the Bible is the word of God. Further that since this word of God is self-attesting we have no need for the church to justify the canon. In fact such a move would seem to be positing unnecessary entities and thus violating the principle of Ockham's razor.

NPT

Saturday, June 28, 2008

Proper basicality, Sola Scriptura, and Ockham's Razor

When we read the Bible we have spontaneous belief formation that what we are reading is God's word. This is what Christian Philosopher Alvin Plantinga calls a "basic belief". Such beliefs have warrant if they produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a truth conducive environment with a design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs. Now this particular epistemological view point is externalistic and is pretty contentious view point since the majority of epistemologists are internalist. But despite that fact it seems to me to be the most reasonable alternative since internalistic epistemologists have failed to give sufficient internal grounds for such beliefs as the external world, our memory being reliable, and induction.

Since it seems reasonable to hold to externalistic proper functionalism then we can apply such notions to the reading of scripture. When we read the Bible we often have a belief form in us that makes us think that God is speaking to us in these documents and in the absence of a reason to doubt this we are warranted in thinking that the Old and New Testament is God's word.

Oddly enough Catholics and Eastern Orthodox think that it is a epistemic virtue in it's own right that we have warrant for the canon. This is when their canon argument comes into play. The East or the West will say "you can't justify the canon and this is a problem for your Protestant view point." But if we could be so sly as to turn the tables on them and ask "Why would we want to do such a thing as that?" If the Bible is not already properly basic and there is no reason for thinking it to be God's revelation then why do we need to justify it in the first place. This is because I think the East and the West are presupposing the Protestant view point because they themselves have such a belief formation through the cognitive faculty of the Holy Spirit when they read Holy Scripture. This is why they feel they ought to have an epistemological framework to justify scripture because it is an already had particular of knowledge.

Finally, if this is all true and it seems reasonable to think that it is, then why do we need an authoritative church speaking for God to justify canon? If it is already properly basic and we have good grounds for thinking it true then we don't need to appeal to a church at all. Why are we positing entities beyond necessity? This does seem to be a violation of a basic principle in metaphysics called "Ockham's Razor". This principle says that we shouldn't posit entities beyond necessity. But this is of course this is what the Roman and Eastern church does. So in light of these consideration's it seems that the Protestant position is once again the most reasonable.

NPT